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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EWELL & SON, INC, a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent Case No.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
12166
WESTERN RAILROAD COMP ANY, a corporation,
Defendant-Appellant,
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant-A ppel1ant
PETITION FOR REHEARING BY APPELLANT, UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF
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Appeal by Union Pacific Railroad Company, Defendant-Appellant,
from a Judgment on Jury Verdict and Amended Judgment
entered by the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, the
Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, Judge Presiding, in Favor of
Ewell & Son, Inc., a corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent.
, IUD L. MARTINEAU
'·Counsel for Plaintiff-Respondent
Continental Bank Bldg.
Dtit Lake City, Utah
IACK L. CRELLIN
Counsel for Defendant-Respondent,
llli:lt Lake City Corporation,
01 City & County Bldg.,
. t Lake City, utah
'VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
. McCARTHY
1 for Defendant-Appellant
Denver and Rio Grande Western
oad Company
(1&1 ·East 1st South Street
'tilt Lake City, Vtah
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D. A.BYBEE
N. W. KETTNER
S. A. GOODSELL
J. C. WILLIAMS
Counsel for Union Pacifc
Railroad Company,
Defendant-Appellant,
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
E'VELL & SON, INC, a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent.
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent
THE DENYER AND RIO GRANDE
\VESTERN RAILROAD COMP ANY, a corporation,
Defendant-Appellant,

I

Case No.
12166

UXION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation,
Def endant-Appellant

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Comes now Union Pacific Raliroad Company,
defendant and appellant herein (hereinafter called
l' nion Pacific), and petitions this Court for a rehearing
of the above-entitled case heretofore decided by opinion
of this Court made and entered February 10, 1972.
This petition is based upon the following grounds:
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1. This Court's opm1on affirming the j udgm ·nt

below in its entirety imposes upon Union Pacific the
burden of a contract between plaintiff and Union
Pacific, but denies Union Pacific the benefit of that
that same contract and this result arises (a) from the
Court's failure to consider or decide Union Pacific's primary contentions in respect to the portion of the judgment against Union Pacific attributable to delay; (h)
from the Court's failure to distinguish between the re·
spective positions of Union Pacific and the other def end.
ant railroad, The Denver and Rio Grande \Vestern
Railroad Company (hereinafter called Rio Grande).
in respect to the delay portion of the judgment and
from its erroneous decision of that issue solely upon Rio
Grande' s position; and ( c) from the Court's fail me
to consider that its decision stating what the jury was
entitled to find in respect to the agreement between
plaintiff and Union Pacific effectively precludes a
judgment against Union Pacific for the type of delay
charged Union Pacific by plaintiff herein.
2. The Court's opinion when applied to the instruc-

tions given by the lower court in this case erroneously,
but effectively, abolishes the historic function of the
judge in instructing the jury in this state, and allows
the jury to determine what the law is or will be in respect
to a particular matter.
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Respectfully submitted,

A. U. Miner
D. A. Bybee
N. W. Kettner
S.A. Goodsell
J. C. Williams
Counsel for Union Pacific
Railroad Company
Defendant-Appellant
10 South Main Street,

Salt Lake City, Utah
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT, UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANY, IN SUPPORT OF
ITS PETITION FOR REHEARING

PRELIMINARY STATE.MENT
Throughout the lengthy history of this case Union
Pacific has been plagued with the problem that the
jury and the trial court have failed and/or refused to
distinguish its position from that of the Rio Grande.
The opinion of this Court shows that it also has failed
to distinguish between the respective positions of the
defendant railroads in relation to the delay porti011s
of the judgment entered against each railroad. In Union
Pacific's Point I agued hereinafter, Union Pacific will
demonstrate that its position in respect to that portion
of the judgment against it attributable to delay is
correct and that such position was not considered by
the Court in rendering its opinion. In Union Pacific's
Point II it will demonstrate that the Court's opinion
in this case in relation to instructions given herein
abolishes the historic duty of the trial judge to instruct
the jury concerning the law.
ARGUMENT POINT I
In its opinion filed herein, this Court affirmed the
jury finding of a contract between Union Pacific and
plaintiff and stated:
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"Upon the evidence, viewed in the light favorable to the plaintiff, the jury could have looked
at the facts in this manner: after the Railroads
had been advised by the City that they would
be responsible for additional expense because of
the presence of their tracks; and their representatives had asked for and were given figures by
the plaintiff concerning the additional expense,
if they had any objection to the plaintiff's figures,
they should have so stated; and that by remaining silent in full awareness that the plaintiff
was proceeding with the project they should be
deemed to have the obligation to compensate
him in accordance with the figures he had given
them."
Assuming the truth of the above quote (and the
Court and jury has now so found) then part of the
additional expense that was the responsibility of the
railroads arising from the presence of their tracks was
that involved in exposing and protecting the railroad
and highway signal cables located at those tracks.
Plaintiff's entire claim and judgment for delay against
Union Pacific arose from the need to locate, expose
and protect those cables by hand digging. Plaintiff
had no problem with Union Pacific's cooperation in
removing its tracks and in attempting to locate and
expose its cables. ( R. 599-603) Plaintiff failed to
segregate any delay caused by the time needed to locate
the cables and the time required to hand-dig around
them, but lumped its entire claim for delay against
Union Pacific on the fact that the cables had to be
protected. ( R. 595-606) . In its opinion this Court overlooked the basic rule of contract law to the effect that,
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as one of the implied terms of every contract, each party
thereto is required to do everything necessary and
reasonable to carry out the provisions of such contract.
Cummings vs. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619; Burt
vs. Stringfellow, 45 Utah 207, 143 P. 234. Therefore,
when this Court affirmed the jury's finding that plaintiff made an agreement with 'union Pacific based upon
figures quoted by plaintiff and silence by Union Pacific,
the Court and jury necessarily had to find that all of
the expense involved arising from the presence of
Union Pacific's tracks was covered by that agreement
and that any time spent by plaintiff in protecting
Union Pacific's cables because of the need to locate,
expose and hand-dig around them was an integral part
of that agreement and plaintiff cannot recover for such
time in additon to its contract price with Union Pacific.
That the Court failed to consider Union Pacific's position in respect to this contention is demonstrated by
the paragraph of the Court's opinion relating to delay.
In that paragraph the Court begins by saying: "Defendant Railroads each made an attack upon the portion
of damages assess.ed against them for plaintiff's claim
of 'unreasonable delay' arising from their conduct including indecision as to methods of procedure." (emphasis added) Union Pacific respectfully submits that
none of the delay charged to Union Pacific was caused
by Union Pacific's "conduct including indecision."
The only "conduct including indecision" causing delay
to plaintiff was attributable solely to the Rio Grande.
and this Court has failed to differentiate between the
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Jn)e of delay plaintiff charged to Union Pacific and

the type of delay that plaintiff charged to Rio Grande.
i lie Court m that paragraph of its opinion relating to
delay continues by saying "the Railroads' reasons seeking to justify their conduct are a good jury argument."
l n respect to this statement Union Pacific respect£ ully
sulnnil.s dial ic has never sought in any way to justify
its conduct in respect to delay for there is no evidence
in this case of any such conduct of Union Pacific which
necessitated justifying. This statement of this Court
also can only be explained on the ground that this
Court failed to distinguish between Union Pacific and
Hio Grande in respect to the position of each on the
delay portion of the judgment. The delay portion of
the judgment against Union Pacific amounts to
r<1 (R. 122, 123 and 204) and Union Pacific
is entitled because of its contract with plaintiff as found
by the jury and now affirmed by this Court to have
that portion of the judgment attributable to delay
stricken from the judgment together with interest applicable thereto. Additionally, plaintiff's contract with
Salt Lake City provided that plaintiff would be responsible for any damage to cables and would pay the
appropriate utility for damages done to any such
cables. The Court did not even mention in its opinion
the contention of Union Pacific that those provisions
of the City's contract insulated Union Pacific from a
claim arising from the protection of cables even
though it was Union Pacific's number one point on
appeal, hut rather the Court ignored that contention
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and those provlSlons of plaintiff's contract with Salt
Lake City. For the reasons set forth in Union Pacific's
original brief (pages 10, 11, 12 and 13 except for the
last paragraph), Union Pacific on that ground also
is entitled to have the delay portion of the judgment
stricken.

ARGU.lVIENT POINT II
The historic function and province of the co mt
in a jury trial has always been to decide what the law is
and to instruct the jury concerning the law applicable
to the case. Hdl vs. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417
P. 2d 664. In failing to reverse this case for a new trial
because of the manner in which the instructions were
given, this Court in effect places its stamp of approval
upon the abdication by a trial judge of his duty to
instruct the jury concerning the law. This Court's
opinion states that the court correctly instructed the
jury that "no particular instruction or part thereof
should be picked out and considered separately. They
should all be considered together." This Court thereby
implies that the giving of the quoted instruction cured
whatever conflict there might be in the instructions
given by the trial court. Does this Court really mean to
say that a trial judge can give any number of conflicting instructions upon request of the parties and thereupon by giving the quoted curative instruction either
require the jury to attempt a synthesis of the law or
require the jury to make a choice between conflicting
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If so, then the historic function of the
judge to a1struct the jury concermng the law is comp1etely abo1Jshed. In Union Pacific's Reply Brief,
pages 9 and Iv, filed earlier with this Court herein,
it called to this Court's attention the fact that the trial
court did not attempt to formulate any comprehensive
statement of the law applicable to this case and instruct
the jury thereon, but instead gave nearly all of the
instructions requested by each party in separate sets
without regard as to whether there were conflicts between them and withom regard as to whether or not
certain instructions requested by one party were applicable to other parties. Even if the Court were to
conclude that the entire effect of the instructions given
in this case was not prejudicial to Union Pacific, it
1hould at least clarify the duty of the trial court to
properly instruct the jury as to the law and in doing
so clarify that court's duty to resolve conflicting instructions so that the jury will receive a clear unconfused
statement of the law rather than one that allows them
to select what they believe the law ought to be from
various conflicting instructions given. If this Court is
going to condone the practice of giving instructions
without change no matter how conflicting they may be
and intends to say that conflicting instructions are
cured by giving an instruction that they all have to be
considered together, then the Bar of this State should
be so advised so that an attorney handling a jury trial
will know that he should be prepared to assume the duty
of synthesizing the yarious requests for instructions into
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a nonconfusing statement of the law. Appellants were
entitled to have this case reversed for a new trial because
the instructions as given were confusing and contradictory and necessarily prejudicial to whichever party
lost, for the jury was simply allowed to choose those
portions of the instructions they wanted to choose and
allowed to ignore the rest, but even assuming that instructions as given, although erroneous, were not prejudicial, this Court should exercise its appellate function
to put an end to the failure of the lower courts to
synthesize into a comprehensive statement of the law
the various instructions requested by the parties involved.
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CONCLUSION
Without question, this Court failed to consider and
rule upon Union Pacific's contentions in respect to the
delay portion of the judgment against it, and Union
Pacific is entitled to have this Court consider those
contentions and to have the portion of the judgment
against it attributable to delay amounting to $1,992.70,
plus interest, stricken from the judgment. When this
Court affirmed the jury's finding of a contract, it also of
necessity found that one of the terms of that contract
required plaintiff to perform the work necessary to give
rise to Union Pacific's obligation to pay for additional
expense because of the presence of its tracks. In failing
to strike the portion of the judgment attributable to
performance of that type of work by plaintiff after it
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found a contract to exist, this Court committed error of

Lype which compels rehearing herein. In respecl:
l() C11ion Pacilic s secon<l point, Union Pacific would
or<li11ari1y not raise this issue in a petition for rehearing
after a decision thereon hut it feels compelled to reargue
ihis point in order to giYe this Court an opportunity to
correct its error and thereby substantially improve the
orderly administration of justice in this state.
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Respectfully submitted,

A. U. MINER

D.A.BYBEE
N. "\V. KETTNER
S. A. GOODSELL
J. C. 'VILLIAl\iS
Counsel for Union Pacific
Railroad Company
Defendant-Appellant
IO South

Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah

11

